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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL-THE
UNDERCAPITALIZATION FACTOR
HARVEY GELB*
Limited liability is regarded commonly as a corporate attribute,
indeed an advantage of doing business in the corporate form.' Its sig-
nificance to shareholders may be diminished to the extent that creditors
obtain personal guarantees from them 2 or insurance covers certain lia-
bilities. However, neither guarantees nor insurance are always present
or adequate3 and when corporate funds are otherwise insufficient to
cover judgments, frustrated plaintiffs may sue shareholder-defendants
in defiance of the limited liability principle.
The recognition of a corporation as an entity separate from its
shareholders is well established and furnishes a theoretical basis for the
idea that the liabilities of the corporation, whether tort or contract, are
its liabilities and not those of its shareholders.4  Moreover, limited
shareholder liability serves an important public policy-the policy of
encouraging investment by limiting risks. A prospective investor, while
willing to invest some assets and even considerable time and effort in a
new venture, may be unwilling to accept the risk of losing certain other
assets not involved in the venture. Therefore, in a society which wishes
to stimulate investment it is not surprising that the law should sanction,
at least to some degree, a device which protects an investor against un-
limited liability.5 Thus, it generally is held that even when a business is
incorporated for the sole purpose of limiting the liability of its owner,
* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A., Harvard, 1957; J.D., Harvard, 1960.
This article results from research funded by an AMAX Foundation Summer Research Fellowship
for which the author is grateful.
I. "Limited liability is probably the most attractive feature of the corporation .... Gener-
ally, the shareholder's liability for corporate obligations is limited to what he has invested in the
corporation." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES § 73, at 96 (2d ed. 1970). (Hereinafter referred to as "H. HENN.")
2. In the case of close corporations, particularly where shareholder involvement with the
corporation is often significant, certain creditors may insist that loans to corporations be guaran-
teed by shareholders. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
3. There are all kinds of contract creditors such as banks, suppliers, and customers. Some
creditors would be inclined to, and be in a position to, insist on personal guarantees, while others
would not. A corporation may lack sufficient insurance to meet tort claims for a variety of rea-
sons. For example, the claims may far exceed normal expectations, the resources with which to
pay insurance premiums may be inadequate, or the allocation of funds for insurance may be too
small in light of potential risks even though ample resources exist.
4. H. HENN, supra note 1, § 146, at 25 1.
5. Id. at 252.
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this motivation by itself does not stigmatize the entity as fraudulent or
render it ineffective to achieve its purpose.6
There are situations, however, in which courts decide to disregard
the corporate entity or, in other words, pierce the corporate veil. One
familiar generalization descriptive of this phenomenon states that
"when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons."'7 Another court explains that
"the doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' is invoked 'to prevent
fraud or to achieve equity.' "8 While such generalizations give courts
considerable latitude, they afford little guidance as to the bases for
piercing the veil. Moreover, courts often use a variety of interesting
words and phrases, such as, "alter ego," "dummy" and "sham" in an-
nouncing their decisions,9 but such words and phrases of themselves
are of little aid in explaining such decisions. To some extent difficulties
in formulating generally applicable tests may be attributed to the in-
tensely factual nature of the issues involved in piercing cases.' 0 How-
ever, courts often do identify a variety of specific factors such as
undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities and non-
payment of dividends which contribute to the resolution of such cases.
While piercing the corporate veil may occur for various reasons,"l
this article focuses on piercing to enable creditors to collect judgments,
6. See, e.g., Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d
497, 502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).
7. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905).
8. Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955), quoting
International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249,
252 (1948).
9. A collection of such words and phrases is found in H. HENN, supra note 1, § 146, at 250-
51 n.2.
10. A two-pronged test commonly used in piercing cases is as follows: "First, there must be
'such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist.' Second, it must be true that, 'if the acts are treated as those of the
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.'" Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil- The
Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1982). The lack of
utility of such an abstract test (and particularly its first prong) as a tool in deciding cases is appar-
ent. In Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General Products Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1981) the court
said: "No precise test for disregarding the corporate fiction has been articulated by the courts,
each case being regarded as 'sui generis' and decidable on its own facts." In United States v.
Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1977), the court indicated that
"[w]hether the corporate veil should be pierced depends upon the innumerable individual equities
of each case."
1I. For example, piercing may be used to prevent the evasion of a statute, United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905), or to achieve service of
process, Comprehensive Sports Planning, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Country Club, 73 Misc. 2d 477,
341 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1973).
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and its primary purpose is to consider the use of the undercapitaliza-
tion factor in such cases.' 2 In the pages which follow judicial attitudes
regarding the significance and measurement of the undercapitalization
factor are explored as well as the relationship between undercapitaliza-
tion and the other factors which are relevant to "piercing" analyses.
It should be noted that the author subscribes to three positions
which underlie the various observations included in this work. First,
the limited liability attribute of the corporation is worth preserving and
should not be lightly discarded. Second, in certain cases in which a
corporation has been undercapitalized considerations of fairness may
require that the corporate veil be pierced. This is because it is inher-
ently unfair to certain kinds of claimants for stockholders to operate a
corporation without providing it with at least a certain minimal level of
assets in light of the business in which the corporation is engaged.'
3
Third, although capital is one factor it is not always the only cor-
porate asset to be considered in determining the adequacy of the level
of assets provided to the corporation. Thus, an inquiry as to whether a
corporation is "undercapitalized" may prove too narrow, and instead
the question should be framed in terms of whether the corporation has
been provided with an "inadequate level of assets."'
4
Furthermore, regarding the issue of whether the level of assets
provided to a corporation warrants disregard of the corporate entity in
12. Some states have a statutory minimum capital requirement which is quite insignificant.
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-205 (1977) which has a $500 requirement and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.47-14 (1981) which has a $1,000 requirement. This article does not deal with the failure of a
corporation to meet such requirements. This article deals with nonstatutory capital inadequacy
which, as will be seen, is often considered by courts in deciding whether to pierce the corporate
veil.
13. One well known statement discussing the unfairness of undercapitalization is as follows:
If a corporation is organized and carries on business without substantial capital in such a
way that the corporation is likely to have no sufficient assets available to meet its debts, it
is inequitable that shareholders should set up such a flimsy organization to escape per-
sonal liability. The attempt to do corporate business without providing any sufficient
basis of financial responsibility to creditors is an abuse of the separate entity and will be
ineffectual to exempt the shareholders from corporate debts. It is coming to be recog-
nized as the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the
business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective liabilities. If the
capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss,
this is a ground for denying the separate entity privilege.
H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 129, at 302-03 (1946). As will be seen this
statement is not on its face wholly consistent with positions taken in this article. For example, the
statement does not distinguish among piercing cases on the basis of types of claimants involved.
See infra notes 43 and accompanying text. Though obvious perhaps, it should be emphasized that
this is not to say that the failure to provide adequate assets to pay either all valid claims or only
those of certain creditors compels a decision to pierce the corporate veil. To do so would have
destructive implications for the limited liability principle.
14. As indicated, capital may only be one element involved in determining the level of assets
provided to the corporation. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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a given case, the following contentions are made and discussed in this
article: 1) A finding that a corporation has been provided with an inad-
equate level of assets in cases brought by certain kinds of creditors may
of itself furnish an appropriate basis for piercing the corporate veil;' 5
2) Not all claimants are entitled to judicial relief on the basis of the
argument that a corporation has been provided with an inadequate
level of assets; ie., what may be regarded as an inadequate level of
assets to a certain creditor, such as a tort victim, may not be considered
inadequate in cases brought by certain contract creditors; 16 3) While
piercing is sometimes necessary, it is desirable to discourage a prolifer-
ation of piercing suits predicated on questionable allegations of under-
capitalization or an inadequate level of assets, and a judicial approach
which may inhibit such suits should be used; 17 4) Courts cannot focus
solely on initial corporate capital or assets, as some are prone to do, in
deciding whether inadequacy of assets warrants a decision to pierce
because subsequent changes, such as increased hazards or reduced as-
sets, may render a determination as to initial inadequacy irrelevant.' 8
Finally, this article addresses both the factors involved in measur-
ing the adequacy of the capital or assets level of a corporation and the
issues involved in determining who among shareholders and others are
fitting targets for personal liability in cases in which undercapitaliza-
tion or an inadequate level of assets contributes to a decision to pierce.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNDERCAPITALIZATION AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FACTORS
Examination of three specific cases can illustrate judicial attitudes
towards the undercapitalization factor, its significance in case analyses
and its relationship to other factors considered by courts when plaintiffs
15. It will be seen, however, that current judicial attitudes are largely inconsistent with such
an approach in that courts commonly cite a number of factors, some of which are not really
relevant, as bearing on the issue of whether to pierce, and indicate that undercapitalization alone
will not justify piercing but rather that some combination of factors is needed. See infra notes 27,
29-30, 32-40 and accompanying text.
16. As will be seen, however, most courts do not differentiate in the weight to be accorded to
the undercapitalization factor because of the type of claimant involved. See note 43 infra.
17. Of course, this does not mean that success in such a case can only be achieved where a
determination regarding undercapitalization or inadequacy of the assets level is a simple one to
make. The possible complexity of such a determination is discussed in this article under the head-
ing "Measurement of the Adequacy of Capital or Assets." See infra notes 59-71 and accompany-
ing text.
18. Cases taking various approaches as to the appropriate time for the determination of the
adequacy issue are discussed in this article under the heading "Measurement of the Adequacy of
Capital or Assets." See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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seek to pierce corporate veils. Minton v. Cavaney'9 and Walkovszky v.
Carlton20 present straight-forward yet opposing views on whether un-
dercapitalization alone should prompt a court to pierce a corporate
veil. However, DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co. 2!
requires more in-depth analysis before its position can be assessed.
Though seemingly unequivocal in its language that more than just un-
dercapitalization must be shown before a court should pierce a corpo-
rate veil, the opinion refers to a number of relatively insignificant
factors in addition to undercapitalization when making its decision in
support of piercing. Therefore, DeWitt will be analyzed at length to
provide an illustration of the undercapitalization factor's true signifi-
cance in relation to other factors.
In Minton, the plaintiff, whose daughter drowned in a swimming
pool, recovered a wrongful death judgment for $10,000 against the cor-
poration which operated the pool. The judgment being unsatisfied, the
plaintiff sued an organizer of the corporation and obtained a judgment
for $10,000 against his estate, which was substituted as defendant after
his death. On appeal from the judgment, the defendant contended that
the evidence did not support a determination of personal liability. 22
Citing the principle that "[tihe equitable owners of a corporation...
are personally liable. . . when they provide inadequate capitalization
and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs, '23 the Cali-
fornia court concluded that the evidence supported findings of such in-
adequacy and participation and therefore supported the decision to
pierce the corporate veil. 24
While Minion reflects a perspective favorable to piercing the cor-
porate veil because of undercapitalization, 25 Walkovszky evidences a
different point of view. In Walkovszky, a person injured by a cab
19. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
20. 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
21. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
22. 56 Cal. 2d at 579, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
23. Id.
24. Actually though, the Minion decision did not result in a judgment against the individual
defendant because the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to relitigate the issues of
the corporation's negligence and the amount of damages. Id. at 581, 364 P.2d at 476, 15 Cal. Rptr.
at 644. It should be noted too that the court was influenced in the case by disregard of corporate
formalities. Still, a fair reading of the opinion supports the view that undercapitalization by itself
was the decisive factor.
25. Id. at 580, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643. It should be noted that subsequent
California cases retreated from the apparent Minion position which relied so much on the under-
capitalization factor and indicated that undercapitalization alone does not suffice as a basis for
piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614
(1970); and Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972).
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owned by a corporation sought to hold an individual shareholder per-
sonally liable. The shareholder's motion to dismiss the complaint, on
the ground that as to him it failed to state a valid cause of action, was
granted despite allegations of undercapitalization. Allegedly, the indi-
vidual defendant held shares in ten corporations, including the one
which owned the cab involved in the accident, and each corporation
had two cabs and the minimum automobile liability insurance required
by law ($10,000).26 In dealing with the personal liability of the individ-
ual defendant, the court noted that the complaint alleged undercapital-
ization of the separate corporations but did not contain sufficiently
particularized allegations "that the defendant Carlton and his associ-
ates are actually doing business in their individual capacities, shuttling
their personal funds in and out of the corporations 'without regard to
formality and to suit their immediate convenience.' "27 Thus, while it
is clear that undercapitalization by itself would not persuade the Wal-
kovszky court to pierce a corporate veil, it is unclear what weight the
New York court would attribute to the undercapitalization factor in the
presence of other factors deemed relevant by the court. 28
Finally, in DeWitt, a case involving a claim against a shareholder-
president for transportation charges owed by a corporation, the court
felt the facts of the case justified piercing the corporate veil, but not
because of undercapitalization alone.29 The DeWitt court did, how-
ever, indicate that undercapitalization had a role to play and discussed
its perception of that role.
After recognizing that all authorities consider gross undercapital-
ization significant and listing other factors which courts emphasize, the
court in DeWitt indicated that a decision to pierce the corporate veil
26. 18 N.Y.2d at 416, 223 N.E.2d at 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
27. Id. at 420, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
28. In a more recent case, Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1979), the court stated:
"We know of no New York authority that disregards corporate form solely because of inadequate
capitalization." Id. at 588. The court also made the following statement:
Because New York courts disregard corporate form reluctantly, they do so only when the
form has been used to achieve fraud, or when the corporation has been so dominated by
an individual or another corporation (usually a parent corporation), and its separate
identity so disregarded, that it primarily transacted the dominator's business rather than
its own and can be called the other's alter ego. . . .The court will also generally con-
sider whether the corporation was adequately capitalized in determining whether to dis-
regard the corporate form.
Id. at 586 (citations omitted).
29. For some examples of piercing cases listing clusters of factors, see, Martin v. Pilot Indus.,
632 F.2d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. and
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416, 418-19 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Northern 111. Gas Co. v.
Total Energy Leasing Corp., 502 F. Supp. 412, 416-17 (N.D. 111. 1980); Victoria Elevator Co. v.
Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979); Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91
I11. App. 3d 999, 1005, 415 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1980).
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could not be based on a single factor such as undercapitalization or
disregard of formalities, but must involve a number of factors,30 and
must present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness. 3'
However, the court did not persuasively explain why certain other fac-
tors which led to the result (such as disregard of formalities, domina-
tion of operations, and monopolization of benefits by the principal
shareholder) needed to be present in combination with undercapitaliza-
tion. There are several weak links in the DeWitt court's analysis con-
cerning the importance of factors other than undercapitalization.
Therefore, an in-depth examination of the factors relied on in DeWitt
can serve to clarify the significance of the undercapitalization factor.
For example, in discussing the factor of disregard of corporate for-
malities, the court pointed to a lack of shareholder meetings and corpo-
rate records of director meetings and the mere figurehead status of
another director who attended no meetings and received no salary from
the corporation. 32 It was not made clear in the court's opinion why
disregard of corporate formalities was significant in its decision to
pierce the corporate veil. If such disregard confused a creditor into
believing that he was dealing with the individual shareholder rather
than the corporation it would certainly have been quite significant.33
However, there was no evidence presented which showed that disre-
gard of corporate formalities, and particularly the failure to hold share-
holder and director meetings, caused creditor confusion or reliance on
shareholder liability in this case.34 Moreover, the court should have
30. In DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d at 686-87, the court
said:
Other factors that are emphasized . are failure to observe corporate formalities, non-
ayment of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of
unds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other officers
or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact that the corporation is merely a
facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.
31. Id. at 687. The court explained:
But undercapitalization, coupled with disregard of corporate formalities, lack of partici-
pation on the part of the other stockholders, and the failure to pay dividends while pay-
ing substantial sums, whether by way of salary or otherwise, to the dominant
stockholder, all fitting into a picture of basic unfairness, has been regarded fairly uni-
formly to constitute a basis for an imposition of individual liability under the doctrine.
Id.
32. Id. at 687-88.
33. However, in such a situation piercing of the corporate veil may be unnecessary to support
a claim against the shareholder.
34. Indeed there are contrary implications in that the court states:
Finally, it should not be overlooked that at some point during the period when this
indebtedness was being incurred-whether at the beginning or at a short time later is not
clear in the record--the plaintiff became concerned about former delays in receipt of
payment for its charges and, to allay that concern, Flemming stated to the plaintiff, ac-
cording to the latter's testimony as 4redited by the District Court, that "he (ie., Flem-
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recognized that inattention to formalities may be quite common in con-
nection with close corporations and that there is generally no signifi-
cant state interest involved which would warrant allowing such
disregard to contribute to a stripping away of the corporate shield. It is
obviously not a justification for treating defendants in piercing cases
differently simply because their respective corporations are more or less
attentive to formalities. 35
Nor does any good reason appear in DeWitt for the significance
attached by the court to the point that no shareholder or officer ever
received any salary, dividend or fee from the corporation except for the
individual defendant. 36 Surely there is nothing inherently evil about
the fact that no other shareholder or officer received payment and noth-
ing linked that fact to the failure to pay the creditor. Indeed, nothing
indicated that additional payments to shareholders and officers would
result in more funds being available to pay creditors and it is probable
that the contrary would have been true.
Another shortcoming of the DeWitt opinion is that the court felt it
was important that the individual shareholder, who owned the bulk of
the shares, made the decisions and dominated corporate operations. 37
Domination as such is not evidence of any impropriety which should
contribute to a decision to pierce the corporate veil; indeed it would be
foolish to expect that a controlling shareholder in such circumstances
would bring in another person to share in decision making. It gener-
ming) would take care of [the charges] personally, if the corporation failed to do
so . ..
Id. at 689.
35. Still there are many piercing cases in which the nonobservance of formalities is consid-
ered to be a factor. See, e.g., Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Manage-
ment, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975); Gallagher v. Reconco Builders Inc., 91 111. App. 3d
999, 415 N.E.2d 560 (1980). In some cases, however, courts do ignore the nonobservance of for-
malities if the creditor was not prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., North Arlington Medical Bldg., Inc.
v. Sanchez Constr. Co., 471 P.2d 240, 244-45 (Nev. 1970); Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Olson, 26
Wash. App. 638, 644-45, 618 P.2d 1017, 1021-22 (1980).
36. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 688. The court is not alone in attributing significance to such mat-
ters. See Thermo Thrift Indus., Inc. v. Mono-Therm Insulation Sys., 450 F. Supp. 398, 406 (W.D.
Ky. 1978); and Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979)
(nonpayment of dividends a factor).
37. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 688. At various points in the opinion the court referred to nonfunc-
tioning of other officers or directors, lack of participation on the part of the other stockholders,
that the corporation was a one-man corporation, that the other director was a figurehead, that no
other stockholder or officer exercised any voice in corporate operations or decisions, that there was
evidence to sustain the finding of the court below that the individual defendant made all the
corporate decisions and dominated its operations. Thus while the dominance of the individual
defendant obviously figured in some way in the court's decision, just how is unclear. Id. at 687-88.
It should be noted that domination is often referred to by courts in piercing cases. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2256 (1982); Martin v. Pilot Indus., 632 F.2d 271, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1980).
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ally has been the rule that even the shareholder in a one person corpo-
ration is protected by its limited liability attribute, 38 and far from
discouraging domination of corporations by one person there are cor-
poration statutes which expressly contemplate such a situation.39 The
idea of encouraging or compelling participation by more than one per-
son in the close corporation's decision making process as a price for
achieving limited liability would be a radical one. Indeed, a rule which
made domination as such a contributing factor to a decision to pierce
would be inconsistent with the principle that "[o]wnership of a control-
ling interest in a corporation entitles the controlling stockholder to ex-
ercise the normal incidents of stock ownership, such as the right to
choose directors and set general policies, without forfeiting the protec-
tion of limited liability. '40
One last problem with the DeWitt opinion was the court's analysis
in disposing of the defendant's contention that undercapitalization was
irrelevant because of the contractual nature of the claim being pursued
by the creditor. The DeWitt court avoided the issue as to whether un-
dercapitalization should be irrelevant in determining whether to pierce
the corporate veil in contract cases, by pointing to certain special facts
which were present in the case, when it said:
The reasoning is that when one extends credit or makes any
other contractual arrangement with a corporation, it is to be assumed
he acquaints himself with the corporation's capitalization and con-
tracts on such basis, and not on the individual credit of the dominant
stockholder. In this case, however, that reasoning would be inappli-
cable, since the plaintiff did not rely on the corporation's capitaliza-
38. Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91 111. App. 3d 999, 1004, 415 N.E.2d 560, 563
(1980); Jones v. Adamson's, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 282, 283-84, 248 S.E.2d 514, 515-16 (1978).
39. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1402 (Purdon 1982-83) and Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-134
(1977) which contemplate corporate boards of directors consisting of only one director if there is
only one shareholder.
40. Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2256 (1982). However, the circuit court's position in Baker as to what the jury must find
appears abstract:
To justify the extraordinary step of holding the dominant party liable, the jury must find
that this control "amounts to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the
extent that the subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its
own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation."
Id. at 181.
In Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Pollak Indus. Inc., 65 Ill. App. 3d 545, 382 N.E.2d 393 (1978), the
court recognized the basic business reality that in close corporations stock ownership and manage-
ment control are often found in the same person. As such, merely because one person controlled
and dominated the two corporate defendants and was the sole shareholder, principal manager,
and sole source of equity financing for both corporations was not enough justification for holding
him personally liable. Illinois law or policy is not violated because a corporation is under the
domination and control of a principal shareholder who is entitled to all its profits. Id. at 549-50,
382 N.E.2d at 396-97.
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tion but received an assurance from [the dominant stockholder] of
personal liability.4 1
While an assurance to the plaintiff may contribute to a decision to
hold him personally liable, it really furnishes no basis for according
any weight to the undercapitalization factor in deciding whether to
pierce the corporate veil. The patent lack of reliance by the plaintiff on
the capitalization of the corporation, which the court expressly recog-
nized, should diminish rather than increase any inclination which the
court might have to attach significance to the undercapitalization fac-
tor. Of course, if failure to pierce would present the court with an un-
just result, particularly in light of the defendant's personal assurance,
then such assurance may well be an element contributing to a decision
to pierce,42 in a case involving a contract claim like DeWil. 43
41. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 686 n.13.
42. Indeed the court recognized that possibility in DeWitt:
When one, who is the sole beneficiary of a corporation's operations and who dominates
it, as did Flemming in this case, induces a creditor to extend credit to the corporation on
such an assurance as given here, that fact has been considered by many authorities suffi-
cient basis for piercing the corporate veil. . . . The only argument against this view is
bottomed on the statute of frauds. . . . But reliance on such statute is often regarded as
without merit in a case where the promise or assurance is given "at the time or before the
debt is created," for in that case the promise is original and without the statute. . . . A
number of courts, including South Carolina, however, have gone further and have held
that, where the promisor owns substantially all the stock of the corporation and seeks by
his promise to serve his personal pecuniary advantage, the question whether such prom-
ise is "within the statute of frauds" is a fact question to be resolved by the trial court and
this is true whether the promise was made before the debt was incurred or during the
time it was being incurred. . . . This is that type of case and may well have been re-
solved on this issue.
Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted). It may be that to some courts piercing the corporate veil on the
basis of a personal assurance would be easier than making such an assurance binding in the face
of the statute of frauds.
43. The argument for not considering or for giving less weight to undercapitalization in con-
tract cases is supported by the idea that the contract creditor is in a position to insist on safeguards
before dealing with the debtor. White v. Winchester Land Development Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56
(Ky. App. 1979) (Bank's loss was not unjust because it could have secured its loan). Thus in many
contract cases the corporate debtor and its shareholders may be presumed to be saying to the
world of potential contract creditors-"our liability is limited unless you bargain for more"-and
when courts, relying in whole or in part on undercapitalization as a factor, decide to hold such
shareholder liable, they are acting contrary to the expectations of the parties. But see Campbell,
Limited Liabilityfor Shareholders.- Myth or Matter of Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23, 53 (1975) (hereinafter
"Campbell"): "One who signs a contract with a corporation should be entitled to assume that the
corporation has a reasonable amount of capitalization from which he could recover in the event of
a breach." The suggestion that undercapitalization should be weighed less heavily in a contract
case than in a tort case has not been well received in most courts. CARY & EISENBERG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 100-01 (5th ed. 1980). Some courts, however, have indicated
that contract cases should receive different treatment from tort cases. J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc.,
627 F.2d 129, 135 n.13 (8th Cir. 1980) ("In addition, this writer is of the opinion that the courts
should be particularly reluctant to disregard the corporate entity in cases involving contract liabil-
ity as opposed to tort liability." Id. at 135 n.13. (Emphasis in original).) See also Gentry v.
Credit Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975) (plaintiff has "the burden of
justifying a recovery against the parent when he willingly contracted with a subsidiary.")
In another case, Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979), the court refused to
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However, notwithstanding the disagreement with much of the rea-
soning used by the DeWitt court expressed herein, it is submitted that
the court reached the correct result in holding the individual defendant
liable. According to the court, the corporation, as commission agent,
was selling produce (which it never purported to own) for the account
of growers, and "[u]nder the arrangement with the growers, it was to
remit to the grower the full sale price, less any transportation costs in-
curred in transporting the products from the growers' farm or ware-
house to the purchaser and its sales commission."" The court
indicated that the individual defendant was withdrawing at least
$15,000 per year from the corporation even though he must have
known that the corporation could only afford to make such disburse-
ments by withholding payment of the transportation charges due the
plaintiff.4 5 A fair reading of the DeWitt opinion would indicate that
the withdrawal of funds in the particular circumstances of this case was
a crucial factor in the court's decision to pierce the corporate veil in
favor of the plaintiff-creditor.4 6 It is simply contended here, however,
that the withdrawals47 by the shareholder alone, in the circumstances of
this case, justified the result reached-without the need for the court to
pierce the corporate veil indicating that the seller knowingly entered into a contract with a no-
asset corporation formed for the sole purpose of taking title to equipment sold by the seller. Id. at
36. See also Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 988-89 (1971).
44. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 688.
45. Id. at 689.
46. The court stated that:
Were the opinion of the District Court herein to be reversed, Flemming would be per-
mitted to retain substantial sums from the operations of the corporation without having
any real capital in the undertaking, risking nothing of his own and using as operating
capital what he had collected as due the plaintiff. Certainly, equity and fundamental
justice support individual liability of Flemming for plaintiff's charges, payment for
which he asserted in his accounting with the growers that he had paid and for which he
took credit on such accounting. This case patently presents a blending of the very factors
which courts have regarded as justifying a disregard of the corporate entity in further-
ance of basic and fundamental fairness.
Id.
47. It may be that the low level of capital contributed to a corporation would seem important
to a court in a case like DeWitt because the withdrawals could not be justified on the basis of the
investment. made, or because the lack of investment together with the withdrawals raises an issue
as to the good faith with which the business was being operated. Obviously the court in DeWitt
made some linkage between the undercapitalization and the withdrawals. Of course, it should be
remembered in piercing cases that investment is not the only possible justification for withdrawals.
For example, bona fide services to the corporation may furnish the basis for withdrawals. In
Gonzalez v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 455 F. Supp. 363, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), an unsuccessful
attempt was made to pierce the corporate veil. The court indicated that to show that corporate
assets have been siphoned off to the detriment of creditors, more is needed than a recitation of
salary paid to officers: "Some showing is required that in light of the corporation's financial status
the salaries paid were so excessive as fraudulently to deplete the assets available to creditors." Id.
at 367. There is no indication in the DeWitt opinion that any such argument about bona fide
services as a basis for withdrawals was made or could have been made successfully.
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cite extraneous factors.48
It would be useful at this juncture to stress several points in light of
the foregoing discussion of the Minion,49 Walkovszky, 50 and DeWitt
cases. First, it should be noted that the Minton court's sole reliance on
undercapitalization as a sufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil
has not won general acceptance. One need only look at such decisions
as De Wil and Walkovszky as evidence of this judicial unwillingness. 5'
Second, reliance on the term "undercapitalization" as a basis of
decision in piercing cases may .prove unwise because it may reflect only
one element in determining if in a given case the level of assets avail-
able for creditors is fair.5 2 Also the term "undercapitalization" may un-
48. Also, in a case such as this, consideration might be given to whether a theory based on
fraudulent conveyance law should be pursued. An interesting discussion of behavior which would
invoke fraudulent conveyance law in piercing cases occurs in Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 540-41 (1977), which states:
As a gloss on state corporation statutes, state and federal courts have developed a sizable
body of case law dealing with the attempts of corporate creditors to satisfy their claims
out of the personal assets of the corporation's shareholders despite the general rule of
limited liability. Cases of this sort have been referred to by various metaphors, such as
"alter ego" or "instrumentality" cases and attempts "to pierce the corporate veil."
Though behavior which certainly would invoke fraudulent conveyance law often triggers
these cases, courts typically ignore the relationships between that body of law and the
attempts to pierce. Moreover, they usually forego any sustained attempt at a remedial
theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of liability, although descriptive sum-
maries are occasionally attempted.
Id. at 540-4 1.
49. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961). See notes 19-24supra and accom-
panying text.
50. 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). See notes 25-28 supra and ac-
companying text.
51. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91 111. App. 3d 999, 415 N.E.2d 560 (1980);
Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d
837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970), and discussion supra in note 25.
52. Consider, for example, the role which the liability insurance a corporation carries (which
apparently was not present in Minton) should play in a court's determination of fairness in a case
where a personal injury victim seeks to hold a shareholder liable. If a corporation has $1,000 in
capital and $100,000 in liability insurance and the victim's damages exceed $200,000 should the
court ignore the insurance in determining if the veil should be pierced? If the corporation has
$25,000 in capital and carries $10,000 in insurance, should its shareholders be better protected
from personal liability by virtue of the higher capital even though the fund available for the victim
is less? As a matter of policy, it would be unwise and unfair to make shareholders of a corporation
which provided a larger fund for the protection of personal injury victims more vulnerable in
piercing actions brought by such victims than shareholders of another corporation simply because
the latter corporation had more capital than the former. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the
Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 351 (1979), in considering the position of tort
creditors; indicate that the concern of critics of cases like Walkovszky seems to be with current
asset value when the claim is perfected and not with initial corporate capitalization and that the
real issue is one of under-insurance defining that term "as a situation in which a tort claim arises
that cannot be satisfied by the assets of the corporation, whether the corporation self-insures or
purchases coverage from an insurance carrier," and pointing out that "[a] corporation that is not
'undercapitalized,' may be 'underinsured,' or a corporation that is not 'underinsured' may be 'un-
dercapitalized.' " Id. at 366.
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duly focus a court's attention on assets provided to a corporation as
capital at the time of its organization, to the exclusion of consideration
of the adequacy of assets at a later time. A more appropriate and accu-
rate term than "undercapitalization" for courts to use in piercing cases
is the term "inadequate level of assets," and the analysis should focus
on whether the corporation has been provided with an "inadequate
level of assets" to meet the type of claim involved.
Third, the approach of the Minion court in giving decisive impor-
tance to the undercapitalization factor is correct in light of the type of
claim involved in that case; because considerations of fairness and as a
matter of policy the attempted total transfer of the risk of loss from the
business to the tort victim is not justified. Furthermore, in Walkovszky,
which also involved a tort claim, the court could have based a decision
on whether or not to pierce on a determination with regard to the "in-
adequate level of assets" factor and thus could have avoided reliance
on other factors such as nonobservance of formalities. 3
Fourth, while DeWtt, like Walkovszky, illustrates the use of fac-
tors in a piercing case, which are not relevant to or necessary for the
decision, DeWitt presents different considerations as to the significance
of the "undercapitalization" (or "inadequate level of assets") factor be-
cause the claimant is a contract creditor. Although it must be
remembered that courts have not generally adopted a distinction in
piercing cases between contract and tort creditors,5 4 it is argued here
that in the interest of preserving the vitality of the limited liability prin-
ciple, contract creditors who are able to protect themselves should be
precluded from piercing on the basis of the argument that the corpora-
tion has been provided with inadequate capital or an inadequate level
of assets. On the other hand, contract creditors who are unable to pro-
tect themselves when they deal with corporations should arguably be
able to win piercing cases solely because of undercapitalization or inad-
equacy of assets. However, the negative impact of such a position on
the limited liability principle and the resultant chilling effect on invest-
ment should be carefully studied and weighed against its benefits
before reaching such a decision.
53. While it may be contended that the court in Walkovszky was influenced by the presence
of a statutory minimum automobile liability insurance requirement to deny judicial relief predi-
cated on the insufficiency of assets, this would not justify the court's willingness to rely on irrele-
vant factors.
54. For further discussion see supra note 43.
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MEASUREMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF CAPITAL OR ASSETS
Should courts be forums for fine measurements as to whether a
corporation has been properly capitalized or provided with an "ade-
quate level of assets" whenever a plaintiff with an uncollectible judg-
ment against a corporation seeks to pierce the corporate veil? Perhaps
to avoid the significant impacts which would accompany such tasks,
courts have indicated that the extent of undercapitalization (or inade-
quacy of assets) would have to be considerable.
For example, in DeWitt the court referred to authorities which re-
quired that "the corporation [be] grossly undercapitalized for the pur-
poses of the corporate undertaking,"'5 and cited a Supreme Court case
for the proposition that "[a]n obvious inadequacy of capital, measured
by the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has fre-
quently been an important factor in cases denying stockholders their
defense of limited liability. ' 56 Also, in Minton the court concluded: "In
the instant case the evidence is undisputed that there was no attempt to
provide adequate capitalization. Seminole never had any substantial
assets. . . . Its capital was 'trifling compared with the business to be
done and the risks of loss. . .. ' -57 Requiring that undercapitalization
must be "obvious" or "gross" or the capital "trifling" compared with
the corporation's business needs and risks of loss somewhat lessens the
impact of the undercapitalization (or "inadequate level of assets") fac-
tor. 5 8 Such an approach is consistent with the attitude that piercing the
corporate veil should be an unusual remedy.
However, a requirement that the deficiency in capital or assets be
gross or obvious in order to contribute to a decision to pierce a corpo-
rate veil does not make the courts' task a simple one. Whatever the
courts' requirements in terms of inadequacy of assets, courts must still
consider many varying factors relevant to their deliberations. For ex-
ample, where the inadequacy of capital and other assets is at issue the
testimony of expert financial analysts and statisticians as to comparable
businesses may be relevant. 59 Perhaps this analysis might include evi-
55. 540 F.2d at 685 (4th Cir. 1976).
56. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
57. Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 580, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961).
58. This is not to say that all cases which refer to undercapitalization require such extremes.
See, e.g., Martin v. Pilot Indus., 632 F.2d 271, (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Healthwin-Mid-
town Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Pollak Indus., Inc., 65 I11. App. 3d 545, 382 N.E.2d 393 (1978). One might
speculate, however, that the omission of such adjectives, at least in some cases, is inadvertent and
does not signal any difference in approach.
59. See, e.g., J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1980) (witness testified
that the fertilizer brokerage business did not require a great deal of capital); and Costello v. Fazio,
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dence of the adequacy of insurance coverage, and involve testimony
concerning the amounts of insurance carried by comparable busi-
nesses. 60 Furthermore, in addition to consideration of the amount of
capital provided, other factors such as shareholder loans and the
amount of earnings retained by the corporation may be analyzed.
Also, the courts must pay heed to the relevant time periods in-
volved in the cases before them. Whether there was an inadequate
level of assets since the inception of the corporation is of significance.
However, the analysis cannot stop there. For example, if the corpora-
tion was started with an adequate level of assets which thereafter be-
came inadequate the court must then delve into the factors causing the
decline. Obviously, a decline in the amount of assets due to purely
business reasons could be viewed more sympathetically in a decision
whether to pierce than would a situation where the defendant-share-
holder bled the corporation of its assets. All of these factors and many
more may play parts in a court's difficult task of measuring the ade-
quacy of assets.
Analysis of several court decisions reveals an interesting variety of
judicial views on the appropriate time and elements involved in deter-
mining undercapitalization. In De Witt Truck Brokers v. W Ray Flem-
ing Fruit Co. ,61 the court takes the position that the determination as to
undercapitalization goes beyond initial capitalization saying, "The ob-
ligation to provide adequate capital begins with incorporation and is a
continuing obligation thereafter . ..during the corporation's opera-
tions.".62 One problem with the DeWitt formulation is that its tone may
seem rather frightening to the person who is willing to invest but only
on a limited liability basis. On the other hand, the dissenting opinion
in Walkovszky v. Carlton,63 while assuming the relevance of post initial
capitalization factors, adopted a posture somewhat less menacing to the
investor when it said, "Where corporate income is not sufficient to
256 F.2d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1958) (three experts, including a C.P.A., a business consultant, and a
management consultant testified regarding inadequate capitalization). See also In re Mobile Steel
Co., 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977), where the court said: "Capitalization is inadequate if, in the
opinion of a skilled financial analyst, it would definitely be insufficient to support a business of the
size and nature of the bankrupt in light of the circumstances existing at the time the bankrupt was
capitalized." Id. at 703.
60. Furthermore, where a new corporate entity is organized to continue an already existing
business, such as where partners decide to incorporate, the capital and other needs of the new
corporation may be discerned to some degree from a study of the preexisting business. See Cos-
tello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1958).
61. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). See notes 29-48 supra and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 686.
63. 18 N.Y.2d 414, 427, 223 N.E.2d 6, 14, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 595-96 (1966) (Keating, J.,
dissenting).
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cover the cost of insurance premiums above the statutory minimum or
where initially adequate finances dwindle under the pressure of compe-
tition, bad times or extraordinary and unexpected liability, obviously
the shareholder will not be held liable. ' '64
In Arnold v. Phillips,65 the court displayed an ability for in-depth
analysis concerning disputed corporate assets. Arnold formed a corpo-
ration with $50,000 in capital stock and loaned the company $75,500
for building and equipping a plant so that it could begin operations. In
a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding, the court invalidated a mortgage
to the extent that it represented the aforementioned $75,500, conclud-
ing that that sum actually represented capital investment. Neverthe-
less, the court upheld the mortgage insofar as it secured later loans
made by Arnold after the business was launched, saying:
Although the charter provided for no more capital than $50,000,
what it took to build the plant and equip it was a permanent invest-
ment, in its nature capital. . . . There can be little doubt that what
he contributed to the plant was actually intended to be capital,
notwithstanding the charter was not amended and demand notes
were taken ...
After two years of prosperity, with the original capital thus en-
larged demonstrated to be sufficient, with a book surplus of nearly
$100,000 after payment of large salaries and dividends in the form of
interest, there arose a situation very different from that in the begin-
ning. Adversity then occurring raised a problem not different from
that which commonly faces a corporation having losses. It may bor-
row to meet its needs. Had this corporation borrowed of a bank
upon the security of the plant, the debt would no doubt be valid.
What would render it invalid when Arnold furnished the money?66
Moreover, the court indicated why this was not a case in which the
corporate veil should be pierced when it said:
We do not think a case is presented where the corporate entity ought
to be disregarded. . . . That it was created to shield the owner from
liability beyond the capital set up by the charter does not show an
unlawful or fraudulent intent, for that is a main purpose of every
incorporation. It becomes an evidence of fraud only when the capi-
tal is unsubstantial and the risk of loss great, or the contributions to
capital are greatly overvalued, and the like. It would be hard to say
in this case that $50,000 was not a substantial capital, and impossible
so to say after holding that the real capital was $125,500, though
some was irregularly paid in.67
64. Id. at 427, 223 N.E.2d at 14, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96, citing H. HENN, supra note !, at 208
n.7.
65. 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941).
66. Id. at 501.
67. Id. at 502.
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Thus, in Arnold, the court considered a loan to be capital to the
detriment of a shareholder, in that subordination of his claim resulted,
but utilized the capital figure as judicially modified in concluding that
the capital was substantial enough to avoid piercing the corporate veil.
The reasoning in the Arnold case points to the conclusion that certain
funds invested by the shareholders of a corporation in the form of loans
should be treated as capital contributions (or assets provided for credi-
tors) for purposes of determining if a deficiency in the corporate level
of assets exists as a basis for piercing a corporate veil. For example, it
might lead a court to count uncollectible shareholder loans as capital
contributions in favor of shareholders seeking to avoid personal liabil-
ity in piercing cases. 68
Finally, in the case of In re Mobile Steel Co. ,69 which involved an
effort to subordinate the debt of a shareholder to other creditors, the
court rejected the notion that an investor is obligated to pour funds
continually into a corporation to enable it to survive and indicated that
in subordination cases a capital amount is adequate which is "what
reasonably prudent men with a general background knowledge of the
particular type of business and its hazards would determine was rea-
sonable capitalization in the light of any special circumstances which
existed at the time of incorporation of the now defunct enterprise. ' '70 It
continued, "This general definition is helpful because it focuses on the
culpability of the organizer-stockholders and pegs the assessment to
more specific standards which do not involve open-ended quantitative
questions.",7'
It is submitted that a focus on the time of incorporation and orga-
nizer-stockholders as called for by In re Mobile Steel Co. will on occa-
68. In Berlinger's, Inc. v. Beefs Finest, Inc., 57 111. App. 3d 319, 325, 372 N.E.2d 1043, 1048
(1978), the court evidently considered a shareholder loan to the corporation and certificate of
deposit pledged as security for a corporate loan in determining capital, however, the court con-
cluded that the capital was still inadequate.
69. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. Id., at 703.
71. Id. In some of the more recent cases courts continue to favor different approaches. For
example, in Pierson v. Jones, 102 Idaho 82, 84, 625 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1981), the court said:
[Flinancial inadequacy is measured by the nature and magnitude of the corporate under-
taking or the reasonableness of the cushion for creditors at the time of the inception of
the corporation. . . . Here the corporate accountant testified that at the time of its incep-
tion the corporation was not undercapitalized. (Emphasis in original)
Id. at 84, 625 P.2d at 1087 (citations omitted). But see United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Con-
valescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981), in which the
court looked at the continuous excess of liabilities over assets as the indicator of undercapitaliza-
tion. Id. at 419. See also Bucyrus-Erie Corp. v. General Products, 643 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir.
1981). (Instruction to "consider whether the corporation was adequately financed, originally or
subsequently, for the business in which it was engaged" was upheld).
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sion prove unreasonable because of changes in assets and in business.
The determination of the adequacy of the level of assets provided for a
corporation should not be frozen arbitrarily as suggested by courts
which stress only capitalization at the inception of the corporation.
Certainly, for example, at some point in time after funds fall below the
level deemed appropriate for providing the requisite degree of creditor
protection, such deficiency should afford a basis for disregarding the
corporate entity. So too it should be recognized that an initially inade-
quate level of assets can be cured.
WHO is LIABLE?
Who should be personally liable in cases in which undercapitaliza-
tion or an inadequate level of assets is a factor leading to a decision to
pierce the corporate veil? If courts followed Minton v. Cavaney72 they
would impose liability in inadequate capitalization cases on those equi-
table owners of a corporation who "actively participate in the conduct
of corporate affairs. ' 73 This approach is supported by two sensible pol-
icy objectives. First, it provides an incentive to active investors to see
to it that the corporation is properly capitalized or provided with an
adequate level of assets. Second, it encourages investment by shielding
those who are passive investors. 74 Nevertheless, in determining the
range of appropriate targets in piercing suits the determination cannot
be so simplistic because a number of issues are involved.
First, one difficulty with the Minton approach is in determining
what activity is of such a nature and degree as to warrant the fastening
of personal liability on a shareholder. Should every shareholder who is
also a director or employee of a corporation be considered an active
participant in corporate affairs and thereby subject to personal risk in
inadequate capital or assets cases? The extent to which employee-
shareholders or director-shareholders may be actually aware of and un-
derstand the capital and assets needs of the business, either at its incep-
tion or thereafter, may vary considerably. Quite obviously, certain
employees may have nothing to do with and be truly ignorant of such
matters. While directors, in theory at least, may be expected to know
more, in practice they may also be ignorant of such matters. On the
one hand, it certainly seems that the proposition that ignorance or inac-
tivity should be an absolute bar to a successful piercing suit against an
72. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961). See notes 19-23 supra and accom-
panying text.
73. Id. at 579, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
74. See Campbell, supra note 43, at 52-53.
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employee-shareholder or director-shareholder is untenable. 75 But, on
the other hand, such a shareholder, even if assumed to be aware of
capital or assets needs, would not be an appropriate target in a piercing
suit if lacking the power to do anything about such matters.
Of course, determinations as to the power which a particular
shareholder may have in the corporate structure may not be easy to
make. Conceivably, even where a shareholder unsuccessfully advo-
cates improved capitalization or higher insurance, a question may be
raised as to the sincerity of such efforts and as to whether a genuine
effort could have improved the situation. In addition, while the conten-
tion may be made that failure of a shareholder to become disengaged
from a corporation which lacks an adequate level of assets evidences
complicity in such inadequacy, such an inference may be improper in a
close corporation setting where a ready market for shares most likely is
lacking. Furthermore, the extent of ownership of the employee-share-
holder or director-shareholder may be quite significant if it indicates
that such shareholder alone or with others has the power to control the
corporation and, therefore, may bear a real responsibility for its failure
to be provided with a fair level of assets. Indeed, a shareholder may be
neither an employee nor a director of a corporation and still by virtue
of his holdings actually exercise control over corporate affairs and be
an appropriate target in a piercing suit.
There is also the question of whether a person with sufficient
shares to exercise control in the corporation should escape liability be-
cause such shareholder chooses not to be officially involved in the cor-
poration and refrains from actually exercising any power. This result is
clearly suggested by the phraseology of Minion referred to above.76
Arguably, such a substantial shareholder attempting to reap gains as a
passive investor from a corporation which has been provided with an
inadequate level of assets should not be able to escape potential respon-
sibility by such voluntary abdication. Still, the policy of encouraging
investment by limiting liability may overcome efforts to make a truly
passive investor liable. Certainly, there are situations where significant
shareholders for various reasons are willing to invest funds but not time
75. See Briggs Transportation Co. v. Starr Sales Co., 262 N.w.2d 805 (Iowa 1978), where an
officer-owner who did not actively participate in corporate activities was held personally liable
because "[a]s a major corporate officer she could not avoid liability by emulating the three fabled
monkeys, hearing, seeing and speaking no evil." Id. at 811. But see Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v.
Poynter, 205 Kan. 787, 798-99, 473 P.2d 33, 43 (1970), where a wife who had official involvement
with several corporations and owned all of the stock of two of them was absolved of liability
where she left corporate matters to her husband.
76. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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and effort in a corporation. Should they be discouraged from investing
as passive investors by the potential of personal liability resulting from
piercing suits? While this question is not without difficulty, it is submit-
ted that if investors are truly passive, it may be contended reasonably
that such investors should be immune from personal liability.
Next, because the Minon formulation is expressly directed toward
the liability in a piercing suit of equitable owners who participate ac-
tively in the conduct of corporate affairs, a question which arises is
whether persons with interests in the corporation who are not equitable
owners, such as corporate creditors, may be appropriate targets in
piercing suits. It must be noted that it is possible for creditors not only
to be active in corporate affairs but to be quite powerful. 77 Moreover,
some creditors may be inactive but potentially powerful. Obviously the
position that all corporate creditors, even relatively passive ones who
have the latent power to influence the affairs of the debtor, would be
appropriate targets in piercing suits would involve radical changes in
many creditor-debtor relationships. Many creditors are not inclined,
equipped nor expected to become intimately involved in the affairs of
their debtors. Still there are situations where creditor involvement in
the business of the debtor may become so extensive as to render the
creditor liable in piercing suits. 78
An additional question arising from the Minton perspective is
whether the persons who hold powerful corporate positions should be
held personally liable in inadequate capital or assets cases even if they
have no funds invested in the corporation as creditors or otherwise.
This question may have special significance with respect to those pub-
licly held corporations where the power of management is great and
where shareholders, as such, have little, if any, power to influence cor-
porate affairs. In the face of a strong public policy to protect certain
claimants, non-investors involved in management in such corporations,
and perhaps even in close corporations where they exercise great
power, might be considered appropriate targets in some piercing suits.
A rigid rule precluding the liability of persons who have not invested in
77. See, e.g., Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916).
78. Contrast the approach of the court in Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers
and Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (1973), modif/ed 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court
did not impose liability on a creditor but clearly would have been willing to "[i]f a lender becomes
so involved with its debtor that it is in fact actively managing the debtor's affairs, then the quan-
tum of control necessary to support liability under the 'instrumentality' theory may be achieved,"
Id. at 1105; with the approach of the court in Lane v. Dickinson State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 650, 652-
53 (Tex. 1980), where the court, indicating that it found no authority for applying the alter ego
doctrine against individuals not alleged to be shareholders, incorporators, directors or officers of
the target corporation, refused to hold a creditor responsible for corporate conduct.
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corporations could lead to unreasonable differentiation in treatment
among responsible management; i e., those with even a relatively small
number of shares or other investments could be targets and those with-
out any such shares or investments would not be.
Finally, in what situations, if any, should an investor whose invest-
ment interest has been transferred before a piercing suit is filed be an
appropriate target in such a suit? One can envision various possibili-
ties: an investor's interest may be transferred before the claim which is
the basis of the piercing suit arises or after such claim arises; the asset
level of the corporation may be deemed adequate at the time of transfer
but may become inadequate thereafter; or it may be deemed inade-
quate at the time of transfer. Clearly, it would be just in some situa-
tions to hold the transferor liable. Otherwise a person who owns shares
in a corporation at the time that a claim arises, and who would other-
wise be liable in a piercing suit, could escape liability by simply trans-
ferring the shares prior to the filing of the suit.
Interesting questions may also arise as to the liability of transferees
of shares or other interests. Suppose, for example, that a person
purchases shares of a corporation which has been provided with inade-
quate capital or assets. If the policy of the law is to encourage reason-
able protection for at least some creditors, the transferee may be
obliged to take some action at some point in time to provide such pro-
tection or face the possibility of being considered an appropriate target
in a piercing suit.79
CONCLUSION
As a general rule in piercing cases, where capitalization is relevant
it would be more useful and realistic for courts to try to determine not
merely if there is undercapitalization but rather whether the corpora-
tion has been provided with an "inadequate level of assets" to meet the
type of claim involved in light of the business in which it is engaged, its
financial needs, and risks of loss. In order to avoid a flood of litigation
involving courts in reviewing business judgments of corporate investors
and officials and severely undermining the corporate limited liability
attribute, the judicial climate for piercing suits should be made inhospi-
table, at least to a degree, by courts making it clear that a serious defi-
79. In Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp., 502 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1980),
a transferee's contention that it was not responsible for inadequate capitalization was rejected.
The court indicated that while the capital was established by the original incorporators the trans-
feree could not rely on the original capitalization.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
ciency in the level of assets required must be present before the
corporate entity will be disregarded. It is important also that there be
judicial recognition that while such a deficiency may be unfair to cer-
tain creditors who are unable to protect themselves (such as tort credi-
tors and arguably even some contract creditors unable to protect
themselves) it would not be unfair to those contract creditors who are
able to protect themselves. In addition, to a degree, there must be a
continuing requirement for the maintenance of an "adequate level of
assets" and not one based solely on the assets situation at the inception
of the business. Persons responsible for the conduct of corporate busi-
ness must recognize that at some point the level of assets available, for
some potential creditors at least, is inadequate and must be increased.
By the same token, an initially inadequate level of assets may be made
adequate and cease to be a factor in piercing cases.
It is important too for courts to recognize that in those cases in
which a deficiency in assets is unfair to the creditor seeking to pierce
the corporate veil the introduction of other factors (whether singly or in
combination with the level of assets factor), such as disregard of corpo-
rate formalities, as contributing to the result is unnecessary, irrelevant
and may lead to error.
Finally, even in a case where the court determines that in light of
the claim involved a deficiency in the level of assets exists as a basis for
piercing the corporate veil, the court may well decide to exclude certain
investors from liability. Persons should be free to invest in a corpora-
tion without fear of personal liability if they lack the power to do any-
thing about the provision of assets to take care of claims, or arguably
even where they possess latent power if they choose to be truly passive
investors.
